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Recent literature has shown that the magnitude of behavioral heterogeneity of a population
has an impact on the structure of mean demand. This paper investigates the effect of
aggregation on the magnitude of behavioral heterogeneity if we aggregate disjoint
subpopulations. Using the Hildenbrand and Kneip (1999) framework of behavioral
heterogeneity, we show: (i) aggregation cannot decrease the degree of behavioral
heterogeneity; (ii) conditions under which aggregation increases the degree of behavioral
heterogeneity are derived; (iii) aggregation weakly increases the degree of behavioral
heterogeneity.
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In this note we consider the aggregation of disjoint subpopulations and its eﬀect on
the magnitude of the degree of behavioral heterogeneity as given by Hildenbrand
and Kneip (1999). Similar results might be obtained using the other frameworks
of behavioral heterogeneity. We consider here the Hildenbrand and Kneip (1999)
framework because it directly applies to the Jacobian of mean demand rather to its
Slutsky decomposition terms as in Hildenbrand (1993) and Kneip (1999). Moreover,
their framework is a generalization of Grandmont’s (1992) economy and the degree
of behavioral heterogeneity, as deﬁned by Hildenbrand and Kneip, can only assume
values between zero and one.
Our analysis relates the degree of behavioral heterogeneity of arbitrary com-
posed disjoint subpopulations to the one of the entire population, i.e. we investigate
whether (dis-)aggregation may aﬀect the structural properties of aggregate demand.
This question is important for empirical analysis, since demand systems are often es-
timated using homogenous samples of households. We obtain three results: Firstly,
aggregation never decreases the degree of behavioral heterogeneity. In other words,
the degree of behavioral heterogeneity at the aggregate level is higher than the lowest
degree of behavioral heterogeneity of arbitrary disjoint subpopulation. Secondly, we
show that the degree of behavioral heterogeneity at the aggregate level can be either
greater or smaller than the maximal degree of heterogeneity of all subpopulations.
We derive the conditions for generating behavioral heterogeneity due to aggrega-
tion. Thirdly, and ﬁnally, we show that aggregation weakly generates heterogeneity.
In other words, aggregation leads to a higher degree of behavioral heterogeneity
at the aggregate level when compared to the weighted average of arbitrary disjoint
subpopulations. We conclude that a decomposition of a heterogenous population
into homogenous subpopulations might destroy mathematical properties of mean
demand which are induced by behavioral heterogeneity.
We use the model and the notation of Hildenbrand and Kneip (1999).
2 Behavioral Heterogeneity and Aggregation
Consider m = 1;:::;k nonempty subpopulations of H with ˙ Sk
m=1Hm = H, where
˙ S
denotes the union of disjoint sets. The disjoint subpopulations are allowed to be
of arbitrary size and arbitrary composition.








1Proposition 1 Aggregation cannot reduce the degree of behavioral heterogeneity as
measured by °, i.e. for every H and fHmgm=1;:::;k such that ˙ Sk
m=1Hm = H it follows
°(H) ¸ infm°(H
m):






Suppose we have two subpopulations m and n and assume without loss of generality









































Applying this inequality gives






















for all i;j and p 2 (0;1)l, which proves Proposition 1. ¥
Note, however, that we can neither infer from Proposition 1 that an expansion
of the population by an additional household does not lead to a decrease in the
index of heterogeneity nor that °(H) < supm°(Hm) holds. More generally, we ask
whether °(H) ¸ supm°(Hm) may occur. We show that this inequality does not




(see Figure 1). Therefore

















which is not a unique relation.
The next propositions shed light on this point. Proposition 2 looks at an ex-
pansion of the original population by an additional household, while Proposition 3
considers the general case when aggregating subpopulations of arbitrary size.
The Intruder’s Inﬂuence. We are looking at the degree of heterogeneity while
expanding the original population H by one additional household. Let H+ = H[H1
where H1 consists of one household only, the intruder. Let I I denote the set of (i;j;p)
such that °(H) = 1¡
R 1
0 I²
ij(p)d². Note that I I may contain of more than one element.
2Proposition 2 Increasing the size of the population by one additional household




























˜ i˜ j(˜ p)d² for all (˜ i;˜ j; ˜ p) 2 CI I;
where CI I denotes the complementary set of I I.




ij (p)d² ¸ 1¡
R 1
0 I²
ij(p)d² for all (i;j;p) 2
I I. The intuition is that the inequality is more likely to be satisﬁed if the origi-
nal population is homogeneous or if c1
ij(p) is small, meaning that the variability of
the intruder’s budget share is small at (i;j;p) 2 I I. The second condition ensures








˜ i˜ j (˜ p)d² for all (˜ i;˜ j; ˜ p) 2 CI I and
secondly that at least one original element of (i;j;p) 2 I I remains in this set after
the expansion of the population, i.e. we have the maximal area under the step func-
tion I²
ij(p). Obviously, this condition is likely to be satisﬁed for large populations.
However, the condition is stronger than required, because if for all (˜ i;˜ j; ˜ p) 2 CI I :
c1
˜ i˜ j(˜ p) ·
R 1
0 I²




˜ i˜ j (˜ p)d² ·
R 1
0 I²
˜ i˜ j(˜ p)d². In those cases we do not require
the second condition. However, we use the stronger version of the second condition.









meaning that the intruder needs to have less relative variability of the budget share
for (i;j;p) 2 I I than every household of the original population. In fact, this condi-
tion is stronger than the ﬁrst one.
Let us prove Proposition 2 and illustrate it with the help of three examples.








In the Part A we prove the proposition for the strong version of the ﬁrst condition.
In Part B we show the general result.
A Since G²
ij(p) is the cumulative distribution function of jsi(p;xh)j=dh
ij, we have
for all (i;j;p) 2 I I that G
²+
ij (p) ¸ G²







ij(p) · 0. Using the properties of ﬁrst order stochastic dom-
inance (Lemma 2 in the appendix) leads to °
+








˜ i˜ j (˜ p)d² for all (i;j;p) 2 I I and all (˜ i;˜ j; ˜ p) 2 CI I we









for all (i;j;p) 2 I I [ CI I.
B One can show that
I
²+







































































˜ i˜ j(˜ p)d² ¸
1=(1 + #H) for all (˜ i;˜ j; ˜ p) 2 CI I proves the proposition. ¥
Increasing Heterogeneity Due to Aggregation Suppose H = ˙ Sk
m=1Hm and





Proposition 3 Aggregation increases the degree of behavioral heterogeneity as mea-





















˜ i˜ j (˜ p)d² ¸
#H ¡ #Hn
#H










˜ i˜ j (˜ p)d²:
Proof. The proof follows the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 2.











for all (i;j;p) 2 I I. Let CI I = [2
i=1CI Ii, where (˜ i;˜ j; ˜ p) 2 CI I1 if
R 1
0 I²m
˜ i˜ j (˜ p)d² ·
I²m
˜ i˜ j (˜ p)d² ·
R 1
0 I²n
ij (p)d² and (˜ i;˜ j; ˜ p) 2 CI I2 if
R 1
0 I²m
˜ i˜ j (˜ p)d² ¸ I²m













˜ i˜ j (˜ p)d²










˜ i˜ j (˜ p)d²




˜ i˜ j(˜ p)d²







(#H ¡#Hm)=#H for all m;i;j and p 2 (0;1)l. Hence the set of (i;j;p) such that
°(H) = 1 ¡
R 1
0 I²
ijd² might consist of elements of I I, CI I1 and CI I2. ¥
The ﬁrst condition of Proposition 3 implies that for all (i;j;p) 2 I I the hetero-
geneity of subpopulation n has to be the lowest. The second condition says that
for subpopulation n the largest expanding area below the step function has to be
smaller than the largest diminishing area minus the largest possible size of variation.
The second condition is more likely to be satisﬁed if #Hn is large compared to the
rest of the population.
Weakly Increasing Heterogeneity. Now, we look at a weaker deﬁnition of in-
creasing heterogeneity. Since Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 involve complicated
conditions, this may allow for more intuitive results. We use a concept that compares
the degree of heterogeneity on average.









Before presenting the result by a proposition, we state a lemma.
Lemma 1 For all i;j and p 2 (0;1)l, °ij(p) is an element of a convex set. The
lower bound is infm°m
ij(p) and the upper bound is supm°m
ij(p), where all nonempty
subpopulations Hm are disjoint and H = ˙ Sk
m=1Hm for every positive integer k ·
#H.
Proof. We have to prove that °ij(p) 2 [infm°m
ij(p);supm°m
ij(p)] for all i;j and












which is a convex combination of I²m
ij (p) over m = 1;:::;k. By rearranging, it
follows immediately that















which is evidently a convex combination of 1¡supm
R 1
0 I²m





Now we ask whether °(H) ¸
Pk
m=1(#Hm=#H)°(Hm) holds. Preliminarily, this
inequality is likely to be satisﬁed if all °(Hm) are very small, which corresponds to
very homogeneous subpopulations, or if °(H) is close to one. The next proposition
provides an unambiguous answer.
5Proposition 4 Aggregation weakly generates heterogeneity as measured by °.
Before we provide some intuition, let us prove the proposition.
Proof.










































We remark that the ﬁrst inequality is due to Lemma 1. ¥
Intuitively, °(H) is the smallest weighted average over all °m
ij(p) with respect to
(i;j;p) due to °(H) := infi;j;p°ij(p), while
Pk
m=1(#Hm=#H)°(Hm) is the weighted
average over infi;j;p°m
ij(p). Note, the fact that Proposition 4 includes Proposition 1
as a weak increase in heterogeneity rules out a decrease in heterogeneity as deﬁned
in Deﬁnition 1.
One can infer that the separation of the entire population into homogeneous
subgroups changes the structural properties of mean demand. Then we have on
average less behavioral heterogeneity and we therefore may lose for example the
monotonicity property of mean demand.
Proposition 1 and Proposition 4 are in accordance with results from Kneip (1999)
for the coeﬃcient of sensitivity, a measure of structural stability of a population.
3 Conclusion
We derive suﬃcient conditions for generating behavioral heterogeneity due to ag-
gregation and we show that aggregation weakly generates behavioral heterogeneity.
We conclude that restricting attention to homogeneous subgroups of households
may not allow one to capture the impacts of behavioral heterogeneity on aggregate
values, such as mean demand.
Appendix
Lemma 2 Consider two populations H and H¤ such that I²¤
ij (p) ¡ I²
ij(p) · 0 for
given i;j and ² 2 [0;1]. Then we have
°
¤
ij(p) ¡ °ij(p) ¸ 0:
Proof. For ² 2 [0;1] we have
I
²¤



















ij (p)gd² · 1 ¡ supf°m
ij(p);°n
ij(p)g.
We know that G²
ij(p) = 1¡I²







ij(p) ﬁrst order stochastically dominates G²¤
ij(p). By deﬁnition of ﬁrst order









which is equivalent to
1 ¡ °ij(p) ¸ 1 ¡ °
¤
ij(p):
If this inequality holds for all p;i;j, one obtains °(H¤) ¸ °(H) by deﬁnition of
°(H). ¥
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